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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:
Case No. 900262-CA

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
Priority No. 2

v.

:
%

ELLIS R. BLACKWELL
Defendant/Appellant.

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a conviction for possession of a
controlled substance, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2) (Supp. 1990).

This Court has jurisdiction

to hear the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f)
(Supp. 1990).
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court
correctly denied defendant's motion to suppress evidence, ruling
that the results of a urinalysis submitted to as a condition of
defendant's parole agreement may be used to substantiate a new
and independent charge.

In reviewing the denial of a motion to

suppress, this Court applies a clearly erroneous standard to the
trial court's factual evaluations because "[t]he trial court is
in the best position to assess the credibility and accuracy of
the witnesses' divergent testimonies. . . . "

State v. Johnson,

771 P.2d 326, 327 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, granted,
(Utah 1989) (citations omitted).

P.2d

However, in reviewing the trial

court's legal conclusions based on its factual findings, this
Court applies a correction of error standard.

Id,

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
U.S. Const. Amend. IVs
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and not Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons oxthings to be seized.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Ellis R. Blackwell, was charged on December
13, 1989, with possession of a controlled substance, a third
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2) (Supp.
1990); possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor,
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5(l) (1990); theft of a
motor vehicle, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 41-1-109 (1990); and improper registration, a class B
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-1-142 (Supp.
1990) (Record [hereinafter R.] at 1).
On January 31, 1989, defense counsel filed a motion to
suppress the evidence seized from a vehicle in which defendant
was a passenger (R. at 21).

Additionally, defendant filed a pro

se motion to suppress and motion to dismiss (R. at 23-27).

A

suppression hearing was held February 5, 1990 (R. at 29).
Based on the evidence and memoranda of law submitted by both
parties, the trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress in
a ruling signed February 27, 1990

-2-

(R. at 32-37, 40-42, 90).

At the pretrial conference on April 13, 1990, defendant
negotiated a plea agreement whereby he withdrew his former plea
of not guilty and entered a guilty plea to Count I, possession of
a controlled substance, as a third degree felony (R. at 107).
Based on the plea, the State moved to dismiss Counts II, III, and
IV (R. at 107). Also at this time, defendant filed a Statement
in Advance of Plea of Guilty in which he preserved his right to
appeal the court's suppression ruling (R. at 109-114).

Defendant

was sentenced to an indeterminate term of zero to five years in
the Utah State Prison to be served concurrently with a previous
sentence, and received credit for time served (R. at 115-116).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On December 7, 1989, defendant, a fugitive parolee, was
apprehended by his parole officer (R. at 40). Methamphetamine
was discovered during a search of the vehicle in which defendant
had been a passenger (R. at 40).

Defendant consented to submit

to a urinalysis, pursuant to a condition of his parole agreement,
which revealed the existence of methamphetamine in defendant's
system (R. at 43; see Addendum A for Parole Agreement).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The scope of defendant's parole agreement which
expressly provided for random urinalysis was not exceeded when
the urinalysis results were introduced against him in a criminal
prosecution for possession of a controlled substance.

The Utah

Supreme Court has expressly noted that evidence obtained by a
parole officer is not made unlawful simply because it is turned
over to the police and used in a subsequent criminal prosecution.

-3-

Furthermore, a urinalysis is nontestimonial evidence which does
not trigger the fifth amendment right against self-incrimination.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO SUPPRESS WAS PROPER.
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying
his motion to suppress the results of a urinalysis he submitted
to as a condition of his parole agreement on the ground that the
evidence was obtained in violation of his fifth amendment right
against self-incrimination.

Although defendant concedes that

the evidence was admissible for purposes within the scope of his
parole agreement, he contends it was not admissible to
substantiate a new and independent charge (Br. of App. 4, 6).
Defendant's assertions misconstrue pertinent case law and reflect
a misunderstanding of the fifth amendment right against selfincrimination .
The fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination is not
triggered by nontestimonial evidence; rather, it is a bar against
compelling communications or testimony. Oregon v, Elstad, 470
U.S. 298, 304-05 (1985) (citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S.
757, 764 (1966) (state may force a defendant to submit to a
blood-alcohol test without violating the defendant's fifth
amendment right against self-incrimination)). Following the lead
of Schmerber, the Utah Supreme Court has similarly held that a
breath sample is noncommunicative in itself and that there is no
self-incrimination violation if the defendant is compelled to
provide such evidence. Sandy City v. Larson, 733 P.2d 137, 140
n. 18 (Utah 1987) (citing American Fork City v. Crosgrovef 701
P.2d 1069, 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985) (holding that the fifth
amendment does not prevent the state from obtaining real or
physical evidence from an accused without his consent)). Like
the breath sample in Larson/ the urine sample in the present case
simply fails to implicate defendant's fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination. Furthermore, defendant appears to
overconstrue the fifth amendment case law which does not prohibit
all self-incriminating statements of a parolee or probationer to

-4-

Contrary to defendant's assertion, the scope of his
parole agreement was not violated by use of the urinalysis
against him in a subsequent criminal prosecution for possession
o
of a controlled substance.

A parolee's rights are not governed

by the same standards that govern the privacy rights of
individuals not subject to the supervisory control of the state.
State v. Velasquez, 672 P.2d 1254, 1258 (Utah 1983).

Rather, a

parolee's "rights are affected and modified by the necessary
power that the state must have over parolees to administer
successfully the parole system as a controlled passageway between
prison and freedom."

Ld.

While parolees are entitled to some

expectation of privacy, that expectation does not generally
Cont. his parole or probation officer from use in a subsequent
criminal proceeding. See e.g. Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420
(1984) (concluding that probationer failed to timely assert his
fifth amendment privilege; therefore, his disclosures were not
compelled incriminations and could be used against him in a
criminal prosecution).
2
Defendant asserts that he was told the results of the
urinalysis would not be used against him in a subsequent criminal
prosecution; however, the record is totally devoid of any support
for his assertion. Upon learning of defendant's allegation, the
State filed a motion to stay the trial court's decision on the
suppression motion and to hold an evidentiary hearing to
determine whether the statement was made (R. 38). The State's
motion indicated that it would honor a promise not to prosecute
if the trial court determined that such a promise had in fact
been given. The trial court's ruling on the suppression motion
came down the same day the State filed its motion to stay the
proceedings on February 27, 1989 and did not expressly address
the issue of whether the promise had been made. Although a
hearing on the matter was held March 2, 1989, defendant has not
supplied a transcript of the hearing on appeal. Because
defendant has failed to supply this transcript or other record
support for his assertion that he was told that the urinalysis
would not be used in an independent criminal prosecution, this
court "must assume the regularity of the proceedings below and
affirm the judgment." State v. Robbins, 709 P.2d 771, 773 (Utah
1985).
-5-

require a warrant based on probable cause.

IxL at 1260. A

parole officer may conduct a lawful search without a search
warrant if the parole officer has "reasonable grounds for
investigating whether a parolee has violated the terms of his
parole or committed a crime." j[d.;
1069, 1072 (Utah 1987).

State v. Johnson, 748 P.2d

See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868,

880 (1987) (upholding search of probationer's residence as
"reasonable" within the meaning of the fourth amendment because
it was conducted pursuant to a valid state regulation permitting
any probation officer to search a probationer's home without a
warrant as long as there are "reasonable grounds").
Although defendant's parole agreement expressly
provided for random urinalysis as a condition of his parole, this
urinalysis was not random.

Defendant was required to submit to a

urinalysis only after having been apprehended as a fugitive
parolee.

Thus, the urinalysis was clearly reasonable and related

to the purposes of defendant's parole agreement.

Furthermore,

the Utah Supreme Court has expressly noted that a parole
officer's search of a parolee is not made unlawful "because
evidence incriminciting to the parolee is turned over to the
police and used in a criminal prosecution."

State v. Velasquez,

672 P.2d at 1262 (citing United States ex rel. Santos v. New York
State Board of Parole, 441 F.2d 1216 (2nd Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1025 (1972); Seim v. State, 94 Nev. 89, 590 P.2d
1152 (1979)).

See also Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 F.2d 246, 252,

253 (9th Cir.) (parolee's contention that evidence could only be
used in a parole revocation hearing held to be without merit),
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cert, denied, 423 U.S. 897 (1975).3

Similarly, defendant's

urinalysis was not made unlawful because it was used as evidence
in his subsequent prosecution for possession of a controlled
substance.

Defendant's assertions to the contrary are simply

unsupported by the applicable case law.
CONCLUSION
In view of the above, the State respectfully requests
that defendant's conviction be affirmed.
DATED this

(_ day of February, 1991.
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

IflAN DECKER ~***~~
Assistant Attorney General

3
Furthermore, it is implicit in the following cases that
evidence obtained pursuant to a search by a parole or probation
officer may be used to substantiate a subsequent criminal
prosecution: Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987)
(conviction for possession of a firearm by a felon based on
evidence obtained during probation officer's search of
probationer's home); Toomey v. Bunnellf 898 F.2d 741 (9th Cir.),
(conviction for armed robbery and other offenses based on parole
officer's search of defendant's trunk), cert, denied, 111 S.Ct.
390 (1990); United States v. Scott, 678 F.2d 32 (5th Cir. 1982)
(conviction for alteration of a money order based on deception
exemplars procured by parole officer); Pena v. Statey 792 P.2d
1352 (Wyo. 1990) (conviction for conspiracy to deliver cocaine
and other offenses based on evidence obtained during parole
officer's search of parolee's home).
-7-
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ADDENDUM A

MEMBERS
PAUL W BOYDEN
VICTORIA J PALAOOS
GARY L WEBSTER

PAUL W SHEFFIELO
Administrator

BEFORE THE BOARD OF PARDONS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
PAROLE AGREEMENT
I, ELLIS RAY BLACKWELL, agree to be directed and supervised by Agents of the Utah State
Department of Corrections and be accountable for my actions and conduct to Utah State
Corrections, according "to tnis Agreement.
I furcner agree to abide by ali conditions of parole as set forth in this Agreement and any
additional conditions as set forth by the Utah State Board of Pardons, consistent with the
laws of tne State of Utan. I fully understand that the violation of this Agreement and/or any
conditions thereof or any new conviction for a crime may result in action by the Board causing
my parole to be revoked or my parole period to start over.
CONDITIONS OF PAROLE
On the day of my.release from the institution or confinement* I will
1. RELEASE:
report to my assigned Parole Agent, unless otherwise approved in writing.
2. RESIDENCE:
I shall establish and reside at a residence of record and shall report such
residence or any change thereof to my Parole Agent. I shall not leave the
State of Utah witnout prior written authorization from my Parole Agent. It
is hereby acknowledged that should I leave the State of Utah without written
authorization from my Parole Agent, that I hereby waive extradition from any
state in which I may be found, to the State of Utah.
3. CONDUCT:
I snail obey ali State and Federal laws and municipal ordinances at all
times.
I .shall make written or in perspn reports to my Parole J^gent by the fifth
4. REPORT:
of each and every month or as directed and I shall permit visits to my place
of residence.as required.by my Parole Agent for the purpose of insuring
compliance with the conditions of parole.
5. EMPLOYMENT: I will see* and maintain full-time employment unless I am participating in
an educational or therapy program approved by my Parole Agent.
6. SEARCH:
insure

compliance with the conditions of my parole.
.osives. ,
Annotated,

7. WEAPONS:

8. ASSOCIATION: I shall not associate with any known criminal in any manner which can
reasonably be expected to result in, or which has resulted in criminal or
illegal activity.
9. SPECIAL CONDITIONS: I shall:
1. Pay restitution of $399.75.
2. Submit to random urinalysis.
3. Successfully complete Substance Abuse Therapy. 2^^'jZu*'
S*;^•?'*
4. Not consume or possess any alconol. 5. Successfully complete ISP Program.
Amended 5/15/1989
I nave read, understand and agree to the above conditions and I hereby acknowledge receipt of
a copy of t^is^Agpeffiment
JQ*/
this /^
day o f * ^ 3 u ^
, 19^ffS
WITNESSED BY:
SIGNED:

TITLE:

ADDRESS: f&z/

(&&*£+
AA~«*--*

-pzr

^fg*&r^**^

/fcgfr
Parolee
1&

j*£_

